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CORIOLAN V. IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE: A CLOSER LOOK AT 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE POLITICAL REFUGEE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years concern about international human rights has 
notably increased. There is a closer scrutiny of the repressive poli-
cies of many countries. As President Carter continues his world-
wide fight for human rights, 1 Americans are becoming gradually 
aware of the pitiful conditions prevalent in a number of foreign 
countries. 2 Few nations can boast their governments are free of 
human rights violations.3 Upon a closer examination it is apparent 
that a large number of countries are in the practice of restricting the 
social, economic, and political rights of their citizens. 4 
As a result of such oppressive conditions, many people seek 
refuge in the United States. One method for seeking refuge is by 
claiming that one has been persecuted because of one's race, reli-
gion, or political opinion. Relief of this nature is provided for by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act5 and in the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). 6 Unfortunately, the ad-
ministration of such applicable laws is far from adequate. 
Various factors, both political and legal, weigh heavily against 
the alien. These factors include the reluctance of the United States 
to open its gates to floods of repressed people throughout the world, 
the constraint of the United States' foreign policy and its requisite 
support of leaders of repressive governments, 7 the severe restrictions 
on review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) 
1. N .Y. Times, June 22, 1978, §A, at 17. In welcoming foreign ministers of Latin America 
to the 8th General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Washington on June 
21, 1978, President Carter stated: "My Government will not be deterred from our open and 
enthusiastic policy of promoting human rights, in whatever way we can." Id. 
2. See New Hopes for Human Rights, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 556 (1977) (address by 
Charles W. Maynes, Ass't Sec. for International Organizations Affairs, made before the 
National United Nations Day Committee of the U.N. Association of the U.S.A., in New York 
on Sept. 9, 1977); The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations, 77 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 165 (1977) (address by Secretary of State Vance); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § A, at 
1, col. 3; id. § A, at 14. 
3. U.S. Responsibility Toward Peace and Human Rights, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 759 
(1977) (address by President Carter made before a meeting of the General Council of the 
World Jewish Congress in Washington, D.C. on Nov. 2, 1977). 
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3. 
5. 8 u.s.c. § 1253(h) (1976). 
6. Done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.l.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (effective 
Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Protocol]. 
7. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. 
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administrative decisions, K and the inability of the alien to procure 
evidence that is likely to carry great weight in the decision-making 
process. 11 
In Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 10 the 
Fifth Circuit took significant steps to alleviate and clarify the obsta-
cles presented to the alien seeking refuge in this country. Coriolan 
liberalized current interpretations of immigration law by relaxing, 
somewhat, the evidentiary burden facing the alien seeking political 
refuge in the United States. The concepts articulated in Coriolan 
provide a more humanitarian approach for refugees and are the key 
to a more realistic interpretation of the law. 
II. CORIOLAN V. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
SERVICE 
The petitioners, Raymond Coriolan and Willy Bonannee, 
sought review of the deportation orders entered by the INS which 
denied their request for political asylum. 11 Both of the petitioners 
had entered the United States illegally by boat during 197412 and 
they were therefore clearly deportable. rn The petitioners were Hai-
tian nationals who claimed they would be persecuted if they were 
forced to return to Haiti. 14 
If the petitioners' claims were judged meritorious, the statutory 
provisions would block their deportation. On July 13, 1975, the INS 
convened the petitioners' deportation hearing. 15 At the hearing, the 
petitioners stipulated to their deportability and then applied to the 
district director for political asylum. 16 The district director denied 
the petitioners' requests. 17 The aliens then sought relief under sec-
tion 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 1K The statute 
states: 
8. See notes 82-102 infra and accompanying text. 
9. See text accompanying notes 44-71, infra. 
10. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977) . 
11 . Id. at 995. 
12. While the petitioners did not arrive on the same day, both entered the United States 
at or near Miami, during 1974. Id., n.l. 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976) provides that any alien who enters the United States 
"without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General 
is deportable." 
14. 559 F.2d at 995. 
15. The procedure for a deportation hearing can be found in 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1978) . 
16. 559 F.2d at 995. 
17. Id. 
18. 8 u.s.c. § 1253(h) (1976). 
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The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any 
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion 
the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems it 
to be necessary for such reason. 111 
The petitioners in Coriolan were given the opportunity to pres-
ent evidence to prove that they would be persecuted if returned to 
Haiti. The only type of evidence available to the petitioners, how-
ever, was their own statements. The first petitioner's (Coriolan) 
accounts were sharply self-contradictory. In his sworn request for 
asylum, he stated that the secret police came to his home to arrest 
him.20 Then, in a later interview with an INS investigator, Coriolan 
changed his story and reported that he was never suspected of being 
a Communist and and that the police never came to his home to 
arrest him. 21 During that same interview, Coriolan stated that he 
came to the United States to work, but that he also had "small 
problems" with the police in Haiti.22 Evidently he was involved with 
a man who had problems with the police and who was about to be 
arrested. 2:1 Coriolan claimed that he would be jailed or killed upon 
his return to Haiti, as it was the policy of the Haitian government 
to persecute returning nationals who fled the country illegally. 24 
In his request for asylum, the second petitioner (Bonannee) 
claimed that he feared persecution by the Haitian secret police (Ton 
Ton Macoutes) because of his father's involvement in anti-Duvalier 
activities. 25 Bonannee testified that he had been arrested and 
charged with speaking against the government. 26 Bonannee, like 
Coriolan, also feared prosecution for his illegal departure and stated 
19. Id. 
20. 559 F.2d at 995. Coriolan also swore that the police suspected him of being a Com-
munist because he had been seen speaking to another Communist, Louis Pierre, who allegedly 
was later jailed and disappeared. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. At this point, he related the fate of his mother's cousin who was murdered because 
he refused to give the Ton Ton Macoutes a piece of cloth. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. Coriolan expressed this fear both in his original written request for asylum and 
at his final deportation hearing. Id. 
25. Id. at 995-96. Bonannee stated that his father had been suspected of involvement in 
an anti-Duvalier movement in 1971, and consequently fled to Cuba. The petitioner went on 
to state that in 1973 his father's brother had been apprehended and never heard from again. 
Id. 
26. Id. at 996. In his testimony, Bonannee stated, "The Ton Tons said I was the same 
breed as my father .... The change [sic] was speaking against the government. I don't 
know reason for release." Id. 
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that he expected to be shot or jailed if forced to return to Haiti. 27 
Bonannee's assertions remained essentially the same through-
out his oral interview, though he supplemented his written request 
in some areas. 28 During its investigation, the INS received a letter 
from the Department of State which addressed Bonannee's claims. 211 
The letter stated that while the claim had some substance, the 
political incidents in which his father had been involved had ac-
tually taken place in the 1950's. Taking this into consideration, the 
State Department concluded that is was unlikely that the incident 
concerning his father had lead to Bonannee's arrest.:1° Ultimately, 
Bonannee confirmed that the incident took place in 1956, and that 
it was in that year his father fled to Cuba.:11 Finally, Bonannee 
described the events which led to his arrest, namely, he had a fight 
with a militiaman who then recognized him as a member of a family 
known to be anti-Duvalier.:12 After consideration of the evidence, the 
immigration judge denied both the petitioners' requests under sec-
tion 243(h) and ordered deportation.:i:i 
The immigration judge based his decision on the petitioners' 
failure to prove any actual instances of persecution and conse-
quently concluded that the aliens had failed to show a well-founded 
fear that their lives or freedom would be threatened in Haiti.:14 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), subsequently affirmed the 
lower administrative decision.35 The BIA's decision simply reiter-
ated the immigration judge's conclusion that the aliens had failed 
to show a "well-founded fear of persecution. ":lfi The petitioners then 
27. Id. 
28. Id. Bonannee attributed his arrest in 1973 to becoming an adult (although he said 
he was born in 1941). The petitioner also claimed that after release from prison he remained 
in hiding almost six months, until coming to the United States. Id. 
29. Id. 8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1978) requires the district director of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to obtain the opinion of the State Department when he denies 
a request for asylum as "clearly lacking in substance." Evidently the district director wrote 
a letter requesting this information on December 22, 1975 and obtained a response on April 
12, 1976. 559 F.2d at 996 n.5. 
30. Id. at 996. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. Bonannee also said his "wife" was put in jail after he left the country. Wife in 
Haitian parlance appears to mean the woman with whom he was living. Id. 
33. Id. at 995 n.2. The Attorney General has vested this power in the immigration judges, 
whose decisions are then reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 2.1, 242.21 (1978); see 8 C.F.R. § 100.2(d) (1978). 
34. 559 F.2d at 998. 
35. Id. at 997 . 
36. The BIA's brief decision did not indicate the grounds or the reasoning that the Board 
used in reaching its decision. Thus, the court of appeals had to resort to the immigration 
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appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking review of the 
administrative decision and a request for a reopening of the admin-
istrative proceedings for receipt of new evidence, in the form of an 
Amnesty International report. 37 The report was compiled by a pri-
vate group and went to the issue of whether Haitian political condi-
tions are so specially oppressive that a wider range of claims or 
persecution must be given credence.3M 
The Fifth Circuit agreed to review the administrative decision. 
The court held that the immigration judge may have erred on two 
important legal points. First, in his evaluation of whether the peti-
tioners would be persecuted upon return to Haiti, 311 the immigration 
judge assumed that prosecution for illegal departure was not perse-
cution for one's political views. Second, the immigration judge 
made certain assumptions based on the premise that people without 
overt political activity cannot be subject to political persecution in 
Haiti. 40 It was the majority opinion for the Fifth Circuit that in view 
of the petitioners' new evidence, the Amnesty International report, 41 
the petitioners' claims should have been considered with credence, 
especially with regard to the oppressive conditions present in Haiti 
and alleged in the report. 42 The Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of the aforementioned 
report. 4:1 
The claims raised in this case are similar to claims advanced 
by other petitioners in past years. Section 243(h) has, however, been 
consistently interpreted as giving limited, if any, relief. As men-
tioned earlier, factors weigh heavily against the alien. Foremost 
among these factors, and an important topic considered in Coriolan, 
is the weight to be given the evidence that the alien produces to 
support his case. A related and initial problem that the alien faces 
is the stiff standard of evidence or the burden of proof. 
III. THE STANDARD OF EVIDENCE 
Persecution, under the section 243(h) standard, is defined in 
judge's reasoned opinion. Id. at 997-98. The Board utilized the standard articulated in the 
1967 Protocol, supra note 6. See text accompanying note 135, infra. 
37. 559 F.2d at 1003. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 1000-01. 
40. Id. at 1000-02. 
41. Id. at 1002-04. 
42. Id. at 1004. 
43. Id. 
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Kovac v. Immigration and Naturalization Service44 as "the inflic-
tion of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or 
political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive."45 Recently, the 
United States Government attorneys in Moghanian v. United 
States Department of Justice, 48 urged the court to forsake the more 
lenient standard of Kovac and adopt the stricter standard articu-
lated by the BIA in In re Dunar. 47 The standard the agency advo-
cated required that the petitioner show that "his life or freedom 
would be threatened ... on account of his race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."411 
The Ninth Circuit in Moghanian, refused to apply the stricter stan-
dard, mentioning that Kovac was a well-reasoned decision and the 
court could see no basis for re-examination at that time. 411 
It is clear from interpretation of section 243(h), that the alien 
has the burden of proving to the special inquiry officer'>0 that he 
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or polit-
ical opinion, as claimed.51 In considering this issue, the standard of 
proof52 consistently adhered to is that the alien must present a 
"clear probability of persecution"53 to obtain the discretionary with-
holding of deportation. Typically, the most serious problem facing 
the alien is producing persuasive evidence of political persecution. 
This burden of proof is difficult for the alien to meet, 54 because 
access to evidence of the requisite weight is simply not available. 
The types of reports that are relied on by the INS and the courts 
are those of an official nature, and understandably, not usually 
available to the alien. 55 The Government has an advantage because 
it is able to produce evidence of this nature, in the form of affidavits 
and summaries compiled by the State Department. Through this 
44. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969). 
45. Id. at 107. 
46. 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1978). 
47. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973). 
48. 577 F.2d at 142. 
49. Id. 
50. A special inquiry officer is a technical term for an immigration judge. See note 33 
supra. 
51. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1978). 
52. For an alternate standard, see text accompanying notes 133-139 infra. 
53. Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967). 
54. The court in Kovac reasoned that the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act lightened the burden of the alien, but never indicated the extent of the 
reduction. 407 F.2d at 106. See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra. 
55. In re Tayeb, 121. & N. Dec. 739 (1968) (no documentary proof available); In re Cha, 
B.l.A. No. 14100755 (1971) (unpublished) (documentary proof rarely available). 
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method, the BIA and the immigration judge are able to request 
information relating to the alien's case. 511 
As a result of the evidentiary problem, the Government's evi-
dence, which is based on official reports, 57 is difficult to refute. As a 
rule, the INS does not question these reports. 511 This practice is one 
of the major problems in an equitable determination of the issue. 
The INS' failure to question these reports is the reason why the 
Government's position contesting the alien's persecution is so unsa-
tisfactory. 
It is wholly inappropriate that the reports offered by the State 
Department should be accorded the weight they have received. In 
many instances, the United States has a significant interest in the 
foreign government that the alien is fleeing from. 511 The State De-
partment desires to preserve the status quo, in order to avoid evok-
ing the displeasure of a foreign government. A conflict arises in the 
case of an alien seeking political refuge in the United States. In 
preparing their reports, the State Department may at times be 
faced with the dilemma of disclosing human rights violations at the 
risk of loss of political support from the alleged violators. The State 
Department's possible conflict of interest is too great to accord its 
reports the weight they have been given in the past. 
It is apparent that the State Department reports have a heavy 
impact at the administrative level, because the reports are docu-
mented and appear to be well supported. Furthermore, the effect of 
the report is felt at the appellate court level because of the limited 
scope of judicial review. Depending on a particular circuit's theory 
on review of agency fact finding, the circuit court may not closely 
review the evidence and thus the report will have the same conclu-
sive effect that it had at the administrative level. 110 While the INS 
56. Section 243.3(b), Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operating Instructions 
(April 7, 1971). The Service has been requesting such information from the Department of 
State since 1963. 1 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.lOd, 
at 5-130 (rev. ed. 1978). 
57. The INS requests for information are channelled to the American Embassy in the 
state of proposed destination, whereupon, the Embassy makes inquiries into the status or 
condition of that country, and about the ethnic, social, or political class or group in which 
the alien claims membership. Inquiry is also made as to the alien himself to determine if there 
is a possibility of persecution within the terms of section 243(h). E.g., Asghari v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Service, 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968). 
58. United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953); Sovich v. 
Esperdy, 206 F.Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963). 
59. The United States recognized the Duvalier government and has provided funds to 
train the military police. THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 1975, at 50. 
60. See Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968). 
In Kasravi, the Ninth Circuit noted that the State Department's letter lacked persuasiveness. 
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does have to request a report from the State Department concerning 
the alien's allegations, the results of the report are not conclusive. 
The INS has no obligation to rely on State Department reports 
concerning the alien's allegations of persecution or to accept the 
Department's opinion on whether :refuge should be granted. 61 The 
Department's opinions are merely advisory,112 but the trend is to give 
their reports great weight. 83 At times the alien is not even allowed 
to see the recommendation to refute its contents, and such informa-
tion need not be made a part of the record if, in the opinion of the 
special inquiry officer or the BIA, the disclosure of such information 
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.64 
As a result of the evidentiary problem, often the alien has only 
his own statements to rely on.85 Other forms of evidence which have 
been offered by claimants include the testimony of relatives, 66 ex-
perts, 87 and newspaper articles, 811 all having limited success. In the 
The court went on to question the Department's possible lack of competence to address 
matters such as the ones at hand. Nevertheless, the court sustained the BIA's decision, which 
was based upon the State Department letter. The Ninth Circuit justified its action on the 
ground that the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Attorney General. For a 
discussion on the limited reviewability of administrative decisions, see notes 79-101 infra and 
accompanying text. See also Note, Persecution Claims - The Expanding Scope of Section 
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 13 TEx. INT'L L.J. 327, 332-33 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Persecution Claims]. 
61. In re Lee, 13 I & N. Dec. 236 (1969). 
62. See Zamora v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976). 
The court of appeals was critical of the State Department letters received in evidence in 
persecution claims under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Second 
Circuit felt that the Department went too far when it made recommendations concerning 
particular aliens. The court was disturbed by the weight the INS gave the evidence adduced 
by the Department, and suggested that the Department refrain from applying knowledge of 
the country to a particular case. The court went on to suggest that the State Department 
limit themselves to giving useful information, "legislative facts," about the conditions in the 
foreign country. Id. at 1063. In a footnote, the court added that it would be helpful if the INS 
would furnish the State Department with the names of aliens whose section 243(h) claims 
had been denied, so that the Department could do follow-ups on what had happened to the 
aliens. This would help make the Department analysis of the current situation more realistic. 
Id. at 1062 n.5. 
63. See id. at 1063. 
64. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1978). For a more detailed explanation of this case, see Evans, 
The Political Refugee in the United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204 
(1969). 
65. In re Sihasale, 11 I. & N. Dec. 759, 762 (1966). 
66. Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967) 
(relatives and friends); United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 276 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967) (two brothers). 
67. In re Liao, 11 I. & N. Dec. 113 (1965) (former Governor of Formosa); In re Torres 
Tejeda, 10 I. & N. Dec. 435 (1964) (former agent of a quasi-military security unit in Trujillo 
regime). 
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case of Coriolan, additional evidence was available in the form of 
the Amnesty International report. 811 Coriolan sought to have the pro-
ceeding reopened upon the receipt of this new evidence.70 
When seeking to reopen the hearing to present new evidence, 
the alien faces the same onerous burden of persuasion. Courts re-
quire the alien to show "some likelihood that reopening the proceed-
ings will result in a stay of deportation."71 Thus, the alien must 
demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution."72 One court deter-
mined that aliens must, at the least, advance "some evidence indi-
cating they would be subject to persecution ... . "n 
In Coriolan, the court maintained that the Amnesty Interna-
tional report74 on conditions in Haiti was clearly material.75 The 
68. See 11 I. & N. Dec. at 759; 11 I. & N. Dec. at 113; cf. Henry v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977) (unauthenticated reports). 
69. Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977). 
70. Id. 
71. Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lam Leung Kam v. Esperdy, 274 F.Supp. 485, 488 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
72. Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); 386 
F.2d at 753. 
73. 386 F.2d at 753. 
74. For excerpts of the text of the report, see 559 F.2d at 1002. 
75. Id. at 1003. ·The INS, in Coriolan, asserted that reopening the case to accept new 
evidence was beyond the power of the court because the provision of the statute enabling 
review did not cover this case. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1005a(a)(4) (1970)). The INS urged that 
this statute directed the court to review INS action solely on the administrative record. The 
statute, in pertinent part, states: 
(4) except as provided in clause (8) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the petition 
shall be determined solely upon the administrative record upon which the deporta-
tion order is based and the Attorney General's findings of fact, if supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, 
shall be conclusive . . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1976). The INS contended that section 1105a(a)(4) barred the review-
ing court from using its power to remand upon the receipt of evidence which up to that point, 
had not been admitted into the record. 559 F.2d at 1003. The power to remand is granted by 
28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (1976), which reads as folllows: 
( c) If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the 
proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the 
satisfaction of the court that-
(1) the additional evidence is material; and 
(2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence 
before the agency; 
the court may order the additional evidence and any counterevidence the opposite 
party desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings 
of fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken . . . . 
The majority did not agree with this analysis. In the opinion, it was pointed out that the INS 
did not cite any cases to support its statutory construction. The court relied on Paul v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 521F.2d194 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the Fifth Circuit 
9
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holding in this case demonstrates that increased weight must be 
given to different types of evidence in order to augment the record 
for a clearer understanding of the claimant's position.76 Judicial and 
administrative notice of the foreign country's conditions are impor-
tant factors, especially in view of the unavailability of other types 
of evidence.77 More liberal treatment of the evidence available to the 
alien is necessary. 
The view usually espoused by the court in similar cases was 
aptly argued in the dissent, 78 where the majority was severely ad-
monished for giving weight to "an authorized report. "79 The dissent 
reviewed a number of cases80 dealing with the deportation of Haitian 
nationals and concluded that Coriolan and Bonannee "never came 
within shouting distance" of meeting the burden of persuasion.111 
In support for his contention that the petitioners had not met 
their burden, the dissent cited Henry v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, 82 for the proposition that the court's ability to review 
the petitioner's failure to meet the burden of proof extends only to 
whether the applicant had been accorded procedural due process 
and to whether the decision was reached according to the applicable 
rules of law.83 The dissent criticized the court for its departure from 
cases such as Henry which had refused to grant relief to allegations 
being supported only by "conclusory statements from personal 
entertained a request for a reopening pursuant to section 2347(c). In Paul, the request was 
denied because the evidence sought to be admitted was not material. The Coriolan court 
stated that the court in Paul made no suggestion that section 2347(c) was inapplicable to INS 
cases. 559 F.2d at 1003. Rather, the court decided that the section "authorizes this court to 
order a remand if the additional evidence is material and there were reasonable grounds for 
failure to adduce the evidence before the agency." Id. 
76. More recent clarification of this right to reopen is found in Martinez de Mendoza v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 567 F.2d 1222, 1226 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1977). Here, the court 
cautioned that under normal circumstances a party asserting new and material evidence 
should first resort to the administrative remedies under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1978), rather than 
invoking the court's power under section 2347(c). Id. 
77. See, e.g., In re Joseph, 131. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968). There, the Board took adminis-
trative notice of the fact that conditions in Haiti had not improved to any extent since 1964 
(the death of "Papa Doc" Duvalier). 
78. 559 F.2d at 1004 (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 1005. Judge Coleman characterized the evidence as "an unauthenticated report 
distributed by a private group which purports to deal generally with conditions in Haiti, not 
the circumstances of the petitioners themselves." Id. 
80. Id. at 1004-05 (citing Martineau v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 556 F.2d 
306 (5th Cir. 1977); Henry v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 
1977)). 
81. 559 F.2d at 1005. 
82. 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977). 
83. 559 F.2d at 1005 (citing 552 F.2d at 131). 
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knowledge and unauthenticated reports."K4 The dissenting judge 
characterized the Amnesty International report as an 
"unauthenticated report distributed by a private group which pur-
ports to deal generally with conditions in Haiti, not the circumstan-
ces of the petitioners themselves. "K5 
If State Department reports are to be the only type of document 
acceptable in a refugee's search for relief, then it appears that sec-
tion 243(h) will be of little help to the alien. The decision in Coriolan 
is important for a number of reasons, foremost among these is the 
court's willingness to recognize the importance of new forms of evi-
dence. More liberal concepts of evidence are essential, especially 
when one considers the severely limited reviewability of INS deci-
sions. 
IV. REVIEWABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
A. Errors of Fact 
Although the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view final orders of deportation, K& such decisions by the INS are 
traditionally discretionaryK7 and subject to limited review.HK As a 
general rule, courts are reluctant to review the discretionary deci-
sions of the Attorney General involving findings of fact which have 
been imprecise in explaining the contents or process of what analy-
sis has occurred.K" The courts have the power to review for abuse of 
discretion as well as arbitrary and capricious action on the part of 
the Attorney General.90 Many courts state they cannot substitute 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 222 (1963). See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1105a(a) (1976). The text of the statute reads as follows: "The procedure prescribed by .. . 
shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for , the judicial review of all 
final orders of deportation .. . . " 
87. 375 U.S. at 222. In this case, the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the exercise 
of discretion by the Attorney General was reviewable only in the court of appeals. Although 
Foti did not involve a request for relief under section 243(h) , the Court indicated the rule 
applied to other provisions of the immigration laws in which the Attorney General was 
authorized to use his discretion. Id. at 229. 
88. The courts are reluctant to interfere with the Attorney General's discretion unless 
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or violative of the law. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 
524 (1952); see also Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F.Supp. 535, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (quoting 
Fougherouse v. Brownell, 163 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Ore. 1958)). 
89. See generally In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973) (discussing Muskardin v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969); Kasravi v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968)). 
90. See Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Kerkai v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 418 
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their opinion for that of the Attorney General. Instead, these courts 
satisfy themselves by examining whether the denial of relief is sup-
ported by a "reasonable foundation," 91 "ample evidence,"112 or some 
other evidentiary standard. In other cases, the courts have been 
known to examine the case only to the extent of determining 
whether the Attorney General's reasons are "sufficient on their 
face." 93 
When a court does review for abuse of discretion or arbitrary 
and capricious action on the part of the Attorney General, it is 
reluctant to fully explain its reasoning. Congress eliminated the 
need for a factual finding by the Attorney General in section 243(h) 
decisions, which makes abuse of discretion for findings of fact espe-
cially difficult to establish.94 With some exceptions, courts have 
rarely found abuse of discretion by the Attorney General in denial 
of section 243(h) relief. 95 Furthermore, in the cases where the courts 
have found abuse of discretion, the courts have not clearly articu-
lated their reasoning. It is apparent, however, from the small num-
ber of successful claims, that very few aliens can satisfy the require-
ments necessary to obtain relief. 
While the court in Coriolan did not base its decision on an 
abuse of discretion in the findings of fact, the court .Pointed out the 
deficiencies in the agency's treatment of the evidence. 96 The Fifth 
F.2d 217, 219 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 1067 (1970); Hosseinmardi v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Service, 405 F.2d 25, 27 (9th Cir. 1968); Siu Fung v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 
555, 559 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 801 (1969); Morin v. Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181, 
182 (3d Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 
1955). For a general discussion of the scope ofreview on appeal, see Persecution Claims, supra 
note 60, at 332-34. 
91. See Khalil v. District Director of the Immigration & Naturalization Service, 457 F.2d 
1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972); Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1961). 
92. Antolos v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 402 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1968). 
93. Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536, 537 (7th Cir. 1967). 
94. Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
95. Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) 
(the circuit court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was 
based on "patent misconstruction of the record" and did not weigh the evidence); United 
States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955) (the court took judicial 
notice of the "ruthless behavior" and "hazardous conditions" in Communist China and ruled 
that an administrative decision of fact contrary to a fact judicially known is arbitrary and 
capricious); United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F.Supp. 611, 615-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) 
(the court held that the special inquiry officer, in refusing to reopen proceedings to permit 
respondent to submit her section 243(h) application, acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. The court went on to conclude that the special inquiry officer's decision was an abuse 
of discretion because he had failed to take administrative notice of the repressive conditions 
in Haiti.). 
96. 559 F.2d at 999. 
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Circuit commented that while the judge's decision may be able to 
withstand review, his decision should be articulated since, "it is also 
a familiar principle of administrative law that a reviewing court will 
not supply a reasoned basis for agency action that the agency itself 
did not articulate."97 
The majority opinion indicated that it was difficult to discern 
the basis on which the immigration judge had made his opinion.911 
The court recognized that the immigration judge probably dis-
counted Coriolan's testimony because of his contradictory testi-
mony and expressed dissatisfaction with the immigration judge's 
even more ambiguous decision as to Bonannee's claim.99 Here, the 
immigration judge could have based his decision on a number of 
reasons, yet none were set forth. 100 Although the majority indicated 
that they considered this lack of clarity to be significant, they did 
not base their holding on this issue. Rather, they went on to discuss 
the possible errors of law present in the case. 
B. Errors of Law and Statutory Construction 
Appellate courts have been willing to review cases involving 
section 243(h) decisions for errors of law and statutory construction. 
Generally, this review has centered around interpretation of the 
phrase "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opin-
ion. "101 Courts have reversed decisions of the BIA or immigration 
judges upon finding that the section was misconstrued. 102 In Sovich 
v. Esperdy 103 the Second Circuit held that it had authority to review 
in order to determine whether the Attorney General used the proper 
97. Id. The Supreme Court has made clear it "will uphold a decision of less than ideal 
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v. 
Ark.-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974). 
98. 559 F.2d at 999. The immigration judge concluded that there was no evidence that 
Coriolan had ever been arrested or in trouble with the Haitian police. This decision conflicts 
with Coriolan's statement that the police had come to his house to arrest him because of his 
implications with a Communist. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. These reasons included: lack of credibility produced by Bonannee's testimony, 
disbelief that Bonannee would be punished for his father's deeds of 1956, or that the real cause 
of the arrest was the fight with the militiaman-and this did not constitute a section 243(h) 
persecution. Id. 
101. See Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969) 
(denial of employment and prosecution for illegal departure as persecution); Diminich v. 
Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 884 (1962) (economic sanctions 
as "physical persecution"). 
102. Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963); Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d 
Cir. 1961). 
103. 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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statutory standards in his exercise of discretion. 184 Ultimately, the 
court found he had not and remanded the case so that a new appli-
cation for relief could be considered using the correct standards. 105 
Further clarification of the right to review for errors of law can 
be found in Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service. 11HI In 
this case, the alien, a Yugoslavian national of Hungarian descent, 
left his ship which was docked in a United States port, and con-
cealed himself until the ship departed from the port. The alien then 
presented himself to the INS and sought asylum claiming he would 
be subjected to physical abuse and confinement if he was forced to 
return to Yugoslavia. 107 In Kovac, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded the BIA's decision to deport the alien, in light of the 1965 
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. 18K The 1965 
amendments eliminated the premise on which the BIA based its 
decision, namely, that to come within section 243(h), a denial of 
employment opportunities must extend to "all" means of gaining a 
livelihood. 169 
The court in Coriolan based its decision on the possible errors 
of law present in the case. 110 The majority was disturbed by the 
immigration judge's treatment of the aliens in two important areas 
of the law. 111 The court criticized the immigration judge for his poor 
treatment of the petitioners' persecution claims, 112 as well as his 
premise that the petitioners, because of their lack of political activ-
ity, are unlikely to be the victims of political persecution.11:1 
104. Id. at 25-27. 
105. Id. at 29. The court pointed out that the special inquiry officer had erred and 
misconstrued the statute by assuming that conviction for illegal departure, a crime cognizable 
in another legal system, was never physical persecution, by assuming that punishment for 
illegal departure would not be politically motivated and would therefore not fit the statute's 
requirement of persecution "because of . . . political opinion," and in failing to include 
confinement as a possible form of persecution. Id. at 28-29. 
106. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969). Kovac alleged he would be imprisoned upon return to 
Yugoslavia because his desertion would be interpreted as a denunciation of Communism. ld. 
at 104. 
107. ld. 
108. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § ll(f), 79 Stat. 918 (current version at 8 
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976)). The amendments were viewed by the court as shifting the emphasis 
from the consequences of the oppression to the motives behind it, as well as lightening the 
burden of proof faced by the alien by removing the requirement that the claimant must show 
threat of bodily harm. 407 F.2d at 106-07. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra. 
109. 407 F.2d at 106-07. 
110. 559 F.2d at 1000-02. 
111. Id. at 1000. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1001. 
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Upon hearing the aliens' contention that they would be perse-
cuted for illegal departure if forced to return to Haiti, the immigra-
tion judge wrote, "[i]llegal departure might possibly result in pros-
ecution. Prosecution cannot be considered, under such circumstan-
ces, persecution because of one's political opinions."u4 This state-
ment disturbed the court because of the long line of cases which held 
that prosecution for illegal departure can amount to persecution, 
and in these circumstances relief should be granted. 115 With this in 
mind, the court stated "we doubt that the immigration judge in fact 
meant to exclude all claims of political persecution based on the 
threat of punishment for illegal departure. If not, however, then we 
must speculate as to the actual basis for his rejection of this 
claim."ll& This need to speculate led the court to consider the judge's 
decision concerning the aliens' illegal departure to be a possible 
error of law. The appellate court did not dwell on this issue because 
it considered the immigration judge's view of Haitian political con-
ditions more disturbing.117 
The court noted that the immigration judge based his observa-
tions on a faulty premise. The immigration judge assumed that 
because neither Bonannee nor Coriolan belonged to any political 
organization in Haiti and that since their political opinions did not 
differ substantially from the vast majority of Haitians, they would 
not suffer political persecution. The immigration judge was inaccur-
ately relying on the supposition, "that people without overt political 
activity, or minority political opinions, are unlikely to be the vic-
tims of political persecution."us The court pointed out that citizens 
of Haiti can become the victims of government persecution without 
committing conventional "political" acts, 119 noting that a variety of 
114. Id. at 1000. 
115. Id. (citing Berdo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 
1970); Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969); Janus 
& Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968)). 
116. 559 F .2d at 1000. The court went on to examine the possible reasons the immigration 
judge might have had for rejecting the claim, including rejection of the petitioner's credibil-
ity, refusal to believe the contention that the government prosecution was political in nature 
(prosecution for fairly administered passport laws is not persecution), and disbelief that the 
petitioners left Haiti for political reasons. Id. 
117. Id. The court said: "In short, we would have great difficulty in effectively reviewing 
the immigration's [sic] judge's dismissal of petitioner's fear of persecution for their illegal 
departure. But the failure to adequately evaluate the significance of the illegal departure is 
overshadowed by a more fundamental omission." 
118. Id. at 1001. 
119. Id. 
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cases have been decided both for120 and against 121 the alien where 
there has been no overt political action. 
In some of the instances where the alien has prevailed, the 
courts have taken judicial notice of the political atmosphere within 
the country .122 In Coriolan, the court took the opportunity to ex-
plain, "we do not believe that the immigration authorities could 
properly decide an alien's fate without taking note of conditions in 
the alien's country, to the extent that an awareness of these condi-
tions had become a part of the INS expertise. " 123 This statement is 
significant because the court took judicial notice of the oppressive 
conditions present in Haiti, on the basis of the evidence presented 
and thereby placed in question the immigration judge's perception 
that people without overt political opinions are unlikely to be the 
victims of political persecution in Haiti. If read consistently with 
the case law in this area, 124 one might argue that the immigration 
judge abused his discretion when he viewed the evidence before him 
as raising no more than the usual allegations of persecution. The 
Fifth Circuit did not pursue this issue, however, and instead looked 
to the admissibility of new evidence as a basis on which to remand 
for a reopening of the proceedings. 125 The court also chose not to rely 
120. United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F.Supp. 611(S.D.N.Y.1964) (the court 
held that the alien's evidence of extensive government danger gave her claim "at least prime 
facie credibility" and maintained the INS refusal to reopen was arbitrary and capricious. The 
court also went on to take judicial notice of the conditions in Haiti.); In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. 
Dec. 70, 72 (1968) (the Board also invoked notice similar to that taken by the court in Mercer 
when it stated, "It is a matter of common knowledge and this Board takes administrative 
notice that conditions in Haiti have not improved to any extent since 1964."). 
121. See Paul v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(aliens alleged government beatings, murders, andjailings); Gena v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service, 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970) (alien alleged that his fear of police was the result 
of one of the Ton Tons taking an interest in his wife); Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967) (alien's father was murdered, friends reported the 
police were questioning her whereabouts); In re Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. No. 2433 (Sept. 16, 
1975), aff'd sub nom. Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated, 434 U.S . 962 
(1977) . 
122. 559 F.2d at 1001. 
123. Id. at 1002. 
124. See United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955) 
("On the basis of a fact which we know judicially, an administrative determination of the 
contrary fact is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore administrative action grounded on 
that finding is outside the administrative discretion conferred by the statute."). Rut see Paul 
v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 521 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1975) (where failure hy 
the immigration judge to take notice of the conditions in Haiti was alleged to he prejudicial 
to the alien's rights, but nevertheless was held to be not an abuse of discretion). 
125. 559 F.2d at 1002. 
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heavily on the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 126 a treaty established to protect the rights of refugees. 
V. THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 
Section 243(h) has been the subject of much criticism in recent 
years, because of the narrow scope and the limited interpretation 
given it by the courts.'27 It has been characterized as being incom-
patible with the broad humanitarian policies of the United States 
and as affording little protection to the alien. 128 Perhaps, because of 
the poor rate of success in cases under section 243(h), 129 litigants 
attempt to seek relief under the 1967 Protocol. 
The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968, thereby 
making key provisions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951 Convention)130 applicable to the United States. 
The introduction of the 1967 Protocol into the refugee scene places 
in question the issue of whether the language of the 1967 Protocol 
profoundly alters section 243(h), the current refugee legislation. It 
has been argued that the language of the 1967 Protocol is couched 
in noticeably different terms from section 243(h) and therefore the 
two provisions are in conflict. 131 Two major areas of concern involve 
126. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6. 
127. See Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 
3 INT'L LAW. 204, 230-33 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Evans, The Political Refugee]; see 
!fenerally Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: Further 
Developments, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1972), [hereinafter cited as Evans, Further 
Developments). 
128. Evans, The Political Refugee, supra note 127, at 253. 
129. Id. at 242. 
130. Done July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.l.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered 
into force (U.S.) Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Convention]. While the United 
States was not an original party to the 1951 Convention, when the country ratified the 1967 
Protocol, it also made applicable articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention. See 1967 
Protocol, supra, note 6, art. 1(1). 
131. See Comment, Immigration Law and the Refugee-A Recommendation to Harmo-
nize the Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CALIF. W. INT'LL.J. 129, 151 (1975). It is further asserted 
hy the author that section 243(h) is ripe for supercession. Id. In determining whether the 1967 
Protocol is a self-executing treaty and therefore supercedes the Act, consideration is given to 
the treaty's history as well as the problems it was created to solve. Comment, Self-Executing 
Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United States Charter: A Separation of 
Powers Problem, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 773, 776 (1976) (citing Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 
N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (1964); Schreuer, The Interpreta-
tion of Treaties by Domestic Courts, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255, 271-81 (1971)) [hereinafter 
cited as Self-Executing Treaties]. 
Many other criteria are examined to determine the impact of a treaty. These include the 
terms of the treaty, whereby the treaty is examined for express stipulation that the treaty 
17
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the question of whether the alien's burden of proof has been lessened 
and whether the discretion of the Attorney General has been altered 
by the language of the 1967 Protocol. 132 
The 1951 Convention defined "refugee" for the first time. 
Under the Convention, a refugee is said to be one who, because of a 
well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is 
unwilling or unable to return to his country due to that fear. 1:i:i 
The evidence a refugee must present, to lend support to his 
claim, is a difficult burden to bear. 134 To alleviate this burden, the 
petitioner in In re Dunar argued that the standard of showing a 
"well-founded fear of being prosecuted," as set forth in article 33 of 
the 1951 Convention 135 relieved the alien of the burden of showing a 
"clear probability of persecution." 138 This argument would have 
changed the standard held applicable in earlier section 243(h) 
cases, m by maintaining that it was one's state of mind that was at 
issue, not the likelihood of persecution. 138 The BIA rejected this 
reasoning and held that since the fear had to be "well-founded," it 
was or was not intended to be self-executing. Self-Executing Treaties, supra, at 776 (citing 
.Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1899)). The actual language of the treaty is also examined. 
See id. If the treaty's language is in the present tense, it is argued this provides evidence of 
an intent to make a self-executing treaty. Id. (citing Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 
(1924)). Whereas language in the future usually indicates a non-self-executing treaty . Id. 
(citing Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1929)). The circumstances 
surrounding the treaty's execution is checked. Id. This would include diplomatic correspond-
ence and interpretative documents. Id. (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)). See also 
5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180-83 (1943). Finally, the subject matter of 
the treaty is also examined. See Self-Executing Treaties, supra, at 778. The subject matter 
approach finds its roots in the separation of powers concept. Certain types of treaties within 
presidential control of foreign affairs are inherently more likely to be self-executing (i.e. 
extradition, consular rights, friendship, smuggling and rights or treatment of aliens), whereas 
treaties within the control of Congress (i.e. appropriations, custom duties and disposition of 
government property) are more likely to be non-self-executing. Id. 
132. Comment, supra note 131. 
133. 1951 Convention, supra note 130, art. 1(2). 
134. See text accompanying notes 44-68 supra. 
135. 1951 Convention, supra note 130, art. 33. 
136. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 319 (1973). 
137. E.g., Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 440 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971); 
Hamad v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C Cir. 1969); Cheng Kai 
Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert . denied, 390 
U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967). 
138. In other words, "it is not necessary that the individual seeking asylum he able to 
prove that he would actually face persecution upon his return, but rather that he established 
that his fear of being persecuted, based on his previous activities or other factors, is a reasona-
ble one." ROBERTS, ASYLUM AND CURRENT REFUGEE DETERMINATIONS, 53 INT. REL. No. 20 (May 
25, 1976). 
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could not be merely subjective. 139 A recent Seventh Circuit decision 
supported this conclusion and denied relief. 14° Finally, the Supreme 
Court was given the opportunity to review the issue in Pierre v. 
United States. 141 Here the Court, in a summary disposition, granted 
certiorari, but then vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
for consideration of the question of mootness. 142 Unfortunately, this 
summary action gives no indication to lower courts as to what 
weight the 1967 Protocol should have. 
In reaching decisions like Pierre, the courts have derived their 
support almost exclusively from the legislative history surrounding 
the accession to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. An 
examination of the legislative materials reveals that the Senate did 
not contemplate radical change in the existing immigration laws 
since they thought the laws were generous and a model rfor the 
world. 143 In this case, however, the immigration laws can hardly be 
described as generous for refugees.144 Rather, the courts should look 
to the ideals of humanitarianism espoused by many presidents and 
diplomats. 145 The United States can hardly be viewed as an example 
of humanitarianism when the Government itself does not follow its 
treaties, and the statute it purports to follow is a virtual nullity. 
139. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 319. The Board looked to an early report of the Ad Hoc Committee 
which framed the provision: "The expression well-founded fear of being the victim of persecu-
tion for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, means that a person has 
either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he fears persecu-
tion." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 10 U.N. 
ESCOR, Annex II, 1 at 39, U.N. Doc. No. E/16i8 (1950), quoted in 14 I. & N. Dec. at 319. 
140. Kashani v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 547 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1977). 
141. 434 U.S. 962 (1977). 
142. Id. 
143. See generally President Johnson's message to the Senate, S. Exec. K., 90th Cong., 
2d Sess., at III, in which the President states: "It is decidedly in the interest of the United 
States to promote this United Nations effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status 
for those fleeing persecutions." 
144. For a good discussion of one such instance, see Johnson, Haitian Refugees to Press 
U.S. for Political Asylum, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 1. 
145. Presidents, since Truman, have voiced concern for the plight of refugees. In a letter 
of submittal to President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk informed him that, "United 
States accession to the 1967 Protocol would not infringe adversely upon the laws of the 
country." S. Exec. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at VII. The Secretary of State went on to state: 
Accession to the Protocol would promote our foreign policy interests through 
reaffirming, in readily understandable terms, our traditional humanitarian concerns 
and leadership in this field. It would also convey to the world our sympathy and firm 
support in behalf of those fleeing persecution. Actually, most refugees in the United 
States already enjoy legal and political rights which are equivalent to those which 
states acceding to the Convention or the Protocol are committed to extend to refugees 
within their territories. 
Id. at VIII. 
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In examining the question of whether article 33 of the 1951 
Convention changes the scope of the Attorney General's discretion, 
one cannot help but notice that the language of the two provisions 
is cast in vastly different terms. Article 33 speaks in mandatory 
terms, "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of. territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened .... " 146 Section 2 
of article 33 carves out the only exception to the rule, denying relief 
when an alien constitutes a security threat to the host country or 
has been convicted of a serious crime. 147 Section 243(h), on the other 
hand, merely "authorizes" the Attorney General to withhold depor-
tation where it is his "opinion" that the alien would face persecu-
tion.1414 Using these criteria, courts repeatedly construed section 
243(h) as giving the Attorney General "broad discretion" to with-
hold deportation. 149 The mandatory standard of the 1967 Protocol 
would be a more realistic way of determining relief, rather than 
depending on the discretion of the Attorney General. 
After extensively reviewing much of the 1967 Protocol's legisla-
tive history, the BIA in Dunar considered the question of whether 
article 33 of the 1951 Convention compelled a change in the Attor-
ney General's broad discretionary powers. The BIA implied that the 
Attorney General's discretion afforded the alien enough protec-
tion. 150 It found no substantial difference in coverage of article 33 
and section 243(h), 151 and instead down played the issue by declar-
ing that the BIA was not aware of any cases in which the Attorney 
General's discretionary relief was denied where the alien showed a 
"clear probability of persecution. " 152 
In summary, the BIA concluded that article 33 effected no sub-
stantial change in the application of section 243(h) "either by way 
146. 1951 Convention, supra note 130, art. 33, § 1 (emphasis added). 
147. Id. art. 33, § 2. Section 2 reads as follows: 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country 
in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
148. Immigration & Nationality Act§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). 
149. See Muskardin v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 
1969); Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968); Namk-
ung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 
F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953). 
150. See In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 322 (1975). 
151. Id. at 320 n.20. 
152. Id. at 322. For a complete discussion of this issue, see Comment, supra note 131. 
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of burden of proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions." 15:1 
This position was supported by a subsequent BIA decision 154 as well 
as the court of appeals. 155 
The majority in Coriolan, while not addressing the issue fully, 
did state that the broad grant of discretion given to the Attorney 
General must be measured in light of the 1967 Protocol. 156 The court 
noted that here still existed the question of whether the Attorney 
General's broad discretion had been altered by the 1967 Protocol. 157 
The court, however, briefly passed over this issue in order to reach 
the broader conclusion that adherence to the 1967 Protocol 
reflects or even augments the seriousness of this country's commit-
ment to humanitarian concerns, even in this stern field of law. It 
may be appropriate to add that the foreign policy of the United 
States has recently become more dra}llatically focused in the protec-
tion of human rights around the world. 1511 
This humanitarian approach of the 1967 Protocol, to the refu-
gee situation, is totally different from the spirit in which section 
243(h) was enacted. It is argued that the enactment of the 1967 
Protocol was meant to be a step toward a more sympathetic attitude 
to refugees, and thus modifies section 243(h). Better understanding 
of this argument is obtained by looking at the section's legislative 
history. 
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 243(h) 
Section 243(h) was first enacted, in a form somewhat similar to 
the present one, in section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 1511 
which read, "[n]o alien shall be deported under any provision of 
this Act to any country in which the Attorney General shall find 
that such alien would be subject to physical persecution." 1611 Under 
153. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 322. 
154. In re Cenatice, I. & N. Dec. No. 2571 (Mar. 28, 1977). 
155. Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977) vacated, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) 
(the Court left intact the Service's procedure for determining refugee status); Kashani v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Cisternas-Estay v. Immi-
gration & Naturalization Service, 531 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 8f>3 
(1976) . 
156. 559 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1977). 
157. Id. at 997. The court felt that the 1967 Protocol did not " profoundly [alter! Ameri-
can refugee law." Id. In Pierre, the court did not decide the issue of the 1967 Protocol's effect 
on United States laws. 546 F.2d at 1289. 
158. 559 F.2d at 997. 
159. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987 (commonly known as the 
Suhversive Activities Control Act of 1950, codified at 50 U.S .C. §§ 781-798 (1976)) . 
160. f>f>9 F.2d at 1010. 
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this provision the burden of proving "physical persecution" rested 
on the alien, but the decision of whether to deport was not discre-
tionary. The Attorney General was required to suspend deportation 
when he found the alien would be subject to physical persecution if 
he returned. 181 
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 182 while retaining 
the possibility of a plea of physical persecution, amended section 23 
to emphasize the discretionary nature of the Attorney General. 183 
The amended action read: 
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any 
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion 
the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such 
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reasons. m 
Dissatisfaction with the stringent terms of the 1952 version of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act was expressed by Presidents Tru-
man, 185 Eisenhower, 1811 Kennedy, 187 and Johnson. 188 On July 23, 1963, 
161. The Act was passed over presidential veto. See 96 CONG. REc. 15629 (1950). This 
Act was not implemented to direct relief to refugees, rather it was focused at controlling the 
spread of communism in the United States. See id. The Act reflected some awareness of 
Congress to the situation faced by refugees. S. REP. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950). 
Although the House of Representatives' draft of the Internal Security Act of 1950 did not 
recognize the political dangers to which a refugee might be subjected, the Senate amended 
the draft to include a provision for refugees. Id. 
162. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
163. See United States ex rel. Camezon v. District Director of Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service, 105 F.Supp. 32, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). "It is apparent that the amendment of 
Title 8 U.S.C.A. § 156 by§ 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 was made with the internal 
security of the nation in mind and not with any solicitude for the objectionable alien's 
welfare." ld. 
164. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (emphasis added) (passed over the veto 
of President Truman). The Act constituted a codification and revision of the immigration 
laws then in effect. It was not designed to encourage an influx of aliens, including political 
refugees. See S. REP. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950). 
165. The President's Commission on Immigration & Naturalization, appointed by Presi-
dent Truman in 1952 and headed by former Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman, severely 
criticized the 1952 Act in its report. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME (1953). The Commission said with regard to political asy-
lum: 
ld. 
One of our national traditions is that we have provided asylum and haven to the 
oppressed of other lands. This we were able to do until 1924 because our law was 
flexible enough to meet such situations. Asylum for the oppressed is thwarted by the 
national origins system. . . . 
The United States is one of the few major democratic countries of the free world 
whose present laws impede and frequently prevent providing asylum. 
166. President Eisenhower recommended changes in the Act on a number of occasions. 
K~ .. H.R. Doc. No. 1, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961). 
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President Kennedy submitted a comprehensive program for revi-
sion1119 to Congress, which was endorsed by President Johnson and 
enacted into law in 1965.170 
The 1965 amendments affected the political refugee by substi-
tuting the phrase "persecution on account of race, religion or politi-
cal opinion" for "physical persecution" in section 243(h) .171 The 
legislature recognized that "[t]echniques of persecution are not 
limited to bodily violence alone." 172 The implications of the 1965 
amendments are unclear. The amendments may be read as liberal-
izing the heavy burden of proof. There is, however, no indication in 
the legislative history or congressional intent to support this conclu-
sion. Indeed, given the continuation of the Attorney General's grant 
of discretion, it may be argued that Congress merely expanded the 
types of persecution covered by the section and did not alter the 
burden of proof the alien must meet. As evidenced by cases follow-
ing the 1965 amendments, little practical change has occurred in the 
operation of the statute. 173 As mentioned previously, however, the 
United States is becoming more aware of persecution throughout 
the world, 174 with this perception, comes a need to adapt our statu-
tory provisions to make them consistent with current attitudes. The 
1967 Protocol provides a new route to effectively and moderately 
adapt the current statutes. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Coriolan is an example of a court taking a more contemporary 
approach to the refugee problem. In Coriolan, for the first time the 
court did not delve deeply into the legislative history of the 1967 
Protocol for an excuse to escape applying the treaty's plain lan-
167. President Kennedy expressed dissatisfaction with the Act in his hook . J. KENNEDY, 
A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 77 (rev. ed. 1964). 
168. President Johnson urged changes in the Act. E.g., Remarks to Representatives of 
Organizations Interested in Immigration and the Problems of Refugees, 1 Pue. PAPERS 123 
(,Jan . 13, 1964). 
169. See Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on 
Revision of the Immigration Laws, 1 Pue. PAPERS 594 (July 23, 1963) . 
170. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1557 (1976)). 
171. Id. at 918. 
172. H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1965). 
173. Rut see, Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 
1969). The court in Kovac reasoned that the 1965 amendments lightened the burden of the 
alien. The burden, according to Kovac, is met by showing that "he would probably suffer 
persecution." Id. at 107. 
174. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text. 
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guage. Instead, the Coriolan court looked to the humanitarian ideals 
that the 1967 Protocol sought to implement, rather than looking to 
the restrictive mood in which section 243(h) was originally en-
acted.175 There is support for this approach throughout the history 
of immigration policy. Following the enactment of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950, 176 American immigration policy gradually 
evolved to become a more humanitarian concept. The United States 
moved away from the restrictive construction of the Internal Secu-
rity Act of 1950, by enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act, 177 
which repealed many of the Internal Security Act's provisions. 1711 
Further liberalization and expansion of the scope of the statute can 
be seen in the addition of the 1965 amendments. 1711 It is reasonable 
to assume that the next step in the evolution of the doctrine would 
be implementation of a policy consistent with the 1967 Protocol. 
The United States prides itself as being in the forefront on issues 
concerning human rights. 180 The 1967 Protocol provides the means 
by which the United States can follow through her commitments. 
It would be inappropriate for the United States to expect other 
signatories of the 1967 Protocol 181 to follow the treaty's provisions 
175. See note 159 supra and accompanying text. 
176. Ch. 1024 § 23, 64 Stat. 987. 
177. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
178. Id . at 279-280. 
179. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1G57 (1976)). 
180. See S. Exec. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at III. In his message to the Senate, regarding 
the 1967 Protocol and State Department report the President stated: 
It is decidedly in the interest of the United States to promote this United Nations 
effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status for those fleeing persecution. 
Given the American heritage of concern for the homeless and persecuted, and our 
traditional role of leadership in promoting assistance for refugees, accession by the 
United States to the Protocol would lend conspicuous support to the effort of the 
United Nations toward attaining the Protocol's objectives everywhere. This impetus 
would be enhanced by the fact that most refugees in this country already enjoy the 
protection and rights which the Protocol seeks to secure for refugees in all countries. 
Thus, United States accession should help advance acceptance of the Protocol and 
observance of its humane standards by States in which, presently, guarantees and 
practices relating to protection and other rights for refugees are less liberal than in 
our own country. 
Id. See also TIME, Feb. 27, 1978, at 22. 
181. These include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, 
Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep., Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Fed. Rep. of Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, 
Zaire, and Zambia. 
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when the United States, who played such a large role in its ratifica-
tion, refuses to do so. The approach followed by the court in 
Coriolan better reflects the current American policy of protection of 
human rights throughout the world. 
It is important to remember that seeking refuge under section 
243(h) is a last resort, often a life or death measure for the refugee. 
After an alien is denied relief under section 243(h), he has no alter-
native but to leave the United States. For this reason, sympathetic 
attention must be given to the alien's plea for relief. The United 
States has, for many years, recognized the existence of the refugee 
problem. Adequate legislation exists. The existing legislation need 
only be applied in a humanitarian manner, consistent with contem-
porary American views on human rights. 
It is argued that section 243(h) is ripe for supercession and that 
article 33 lessens the burden of proof that the alien is forced to 
bear. •K2 A more modern approach to the burden of proof issue would 
support the goals the treaty sought to achieve, and make the alien's 
burden more realistic. One reason the aliens burden is so oppressive, 
is that he simply does not have access to authoritative evidence. The 
Fifth Circuit in Coriolan accepted the Amnesty International report 
as relevant material. 183 In giving more weight to a new and different 
type of evidence, such as the reports of private groups and private 
citizens living in foreign countries, the claimants are given a fairer 
chance for relief. 
Other proposed forms of relief include clarification of section 
243(h) by Congress and a more sympathetic and realistic approach 
by the Attorney General when exercising his discretion. The state-
ment that article 33 does not change the immigration laws can be 
negated when one views the apparent problems in implementation 
of section 243(h). One can hardly believe that Congress intended to 
enact a statute which is a virtual nullity. The forerunner of section 
243(h) was enacted in the spirit of the 1950's, 184 at a time in which 
the country was more interested in restricting immigration than 
aiding refugees. The attitudes of Americans have changed substan-
tially since the 1950's, evolving toward a more humanitarian ap-
proach. Currently, while section 243(h) is used by the alien seeking 
asylum, it rarely gives relief. 185 A positive approach to the situation 
182. Comment, supra note 131, at 151-52. 
183. 559 F.2d at 1002-03. 
184. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987 (commonlv known as the 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-798 Ci976)). 
185. Since the 1965 amendments, the BIA has granted a stay of deportation under § 
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and a liberal interpretation of Coriolan will have the effect of brea-
thing new life into a statute which up to this point has lost most of 
its effectiveness. 
Patricia J. Sheridan 
243(h) in only four reported cases: In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70; In re Janus & Janek, 12 
I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968); In re Salama, 11 I. & N. Dec. 536 (1966); In re Alfonso-Bermudey, 
12 I. & N. Dec. 225 (1965) . 
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